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OF THE STATE OF UTAH
G. L. Cloud and Helen Clcud, his wife, and
Sandra Cloud, their daughter,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.
E. S. Ziegler, Judge of the Juventile Court at
Ogden, Utah; Claud Pratt, Superintendent
of the Utah State Industrial School at Ogden,
Utah and Judy Ross, an employee of the
Children's Service Society at Ogden, Utah,
Defendants and Respondents,
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G. L. Cloud and Helen Cloud, his wife, and
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vs.
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Society at Ogden, Utah,
Defendant and Respondent.

Case No.
11016

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action for a writ of habeas corpus to
discharge Sandra Cloud and her male baby from the
custody and control of the defendants.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LU\VER COURT
On August 23, 1967 the Honorable John F.
Wahlquist, Judge of the Second Judicial District
Court denied the petition o:l:' Sandra Cloud to be discharged from the State Industrial School and to release
and discharge her male baby; Court ordered the petition
of habeas corpus for the baby taken under advisement
until the juvenile court has ruled upon its hearing set
in September. The Defense Counsels' to submit the
order of the court to the court for signature. After
juvenile court's decision writ to discharge baby was
denied.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The plaintiffs seek to reverse the order of the
District Court for Weber County, Utah and to have
this court· order the discharge of both Sandra Cloud,
and her baby, and place the baby in her care, control
and custody, or in the alternative ti place the baby in
the care, control and custody of its grandparents.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action was commenced in the Third Judicial
District Court for Salt Lake County, Utah by G. L.
Cloud, and Helen Cloud, his wife, and Sandra Cloud,
their daughter, for a writ of habeas corpus, discharging
Sandra Cloud, a minor of 16 years, and her baby, which
2

had been born to her in the Dee Memorial Hospital
in Ogden, Utah on the 21st day of June, 1967 (R 16Page 18.) The writ was signed by Marcellu.s K. Snow,
one of the Judges of the District Court for Salt Lake
County, Utah, on the 6th day of July, 1967 (R-Page
unnumbered (follows, in R. supplemental petition in
Juvenile Court for Salt Lake County under District
Court No. 173326.) This writ was served upon defendants on July 10, 1967. A motion for a change of Venue
from the District Court for Salt Lake County to the
District Court for Weber County was granted. Motion
to dismiss the complaint of the plaintiffs G. L. Cloud
and Helen Cloud was denied by Judge Snow. After
it had been discovered that the baby had been placed
in the custody of the Children's Aid Society a complaint for a writ of habeas corpus was filed in the
District Court for Weber County of August 7, 1967
against Rex Ashdown, the director of said Society. The
writ was signed by Judge John F. Wahlquist on August
7, 1967 and served upon the defendant the following
day. (R 7). A hearing was held on the complaints
for the writs on August 16, 1967, but continued until
August 23, 1967 (R 8) on which day a further hearing
was held at which time the Court entered the order
appealed from.
Sandra Cloud became pregnant outside of wedlock
and her parents took her to Judge Garff' s Juvenile
Court. There she was given a hearing and an order
commiting her to the State Industrial School, but suspended on condition that she go voluntarily to the State
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Hospital in Provo, Utah, which she did, but after a
four month's stay at the hospital she left the State
Hospital and Judge Garff committed her to the State
Industrial School at Ogden.
A hearing was pending in the Juvenile Court in
Ogden, to have the baby placed for adoption.
District Court cases for a writ of habeas corpus
against E. S. Ziegler et al. was filed in the District
Court for 'Veber County, Utah under Case No. 46885
and against Rex Ashdown, Director of the Children's
Aid Society at Ogden, under Case No. 46888.
The foregoing numbered cases were consolidated
and heard by the court simultaneously on August 23,
1967, upon complaints of 'Vrits of Habeas Corpus,
and at the end of the hearing, the court denied the
Writ of Habeas Corpus involving the custody and commitment of Sandra Cloud to the Industrial School of
Utah, but continued the case involving the custody and
jurisdiction of Baby Boy Cloud until after the hearing
in the Juvenile Court. That hearing was held on Tuesday, the 21st day of November, 1967, in which the
Judge of said Juvenile Court found that the allegations
of the petition to be true, and placed said baby in charge
of the State ',y elf are Department for placement for
his adoption and terminating the parental rights of
Sandra Cloud, his mother.
The Court found relative to the complaint for
Habeas Corpus of Baby Cloud that he was not held
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unlawfully by the State Welfare Department or by
Hex Ashdown as the Director of the Children's Aid
Society, and the writ of Habeas Corpus for release
of the ~aid baby to his mother, Sandra Cloud, or to his
grandparents, G. L. Cloud and Helen Cloud, was
denied.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court
concluded as a matter of law that the '¥rit of Habeas
Corpus releasing Baby Boy Cloud from custody aforesaid should be denied.
Judge Ziegler's Juvenile Court Decree was :filed
December 13, 1967, and appealed from to this court
where the matter can be heard,the court permitting,
simultaneously with the writs of habeas corpus cases.
The Decree provided as follows:
"It is therefore, ordered, adjudged and decreed:
I. That the above named child (Baby Boy Cloud)

is hereby adjudicated within section 77 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1965.
2. That he be and is hereby placed in the legal

custody and guardianship of the Children's Aid
Society of Utah for the purpose of adoption and
that all of the parental rights to said child be and
are hereby terminated.
3. That this case be and is hereby set for review

ont he 26th day of May, 1969.
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First District Juvenile Court
Dated this 21st day of November 1967
By the Court
E. S. Ziegler

ARGUMENT
POINT I
FAILURE TO INFORM THE APPELLANT, SANDRA CLOUD, THAT SHE WAS
ENTITLED TO THE SERVICES OF AN ATTORNEY IN THE PROCEEDING IN THE
2ND DISTRICT, JUVENILE COURT, WAS IN
VIOLATION OF HER CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS.
Although the court found that she had the advice
and counsel of an attorney in the 2nd District Juvenile
Court, she testified that the counsel was hired for her
father and mother, and she had no advice from an
attorney. (See Form 13B containing findings of fact
and decree of the Ogden Juvenile Court.) (See also
Sandra Cloud's testimony before Judge Wahlquist.)
See Tr. 4 & 10, 14, 15, 16, see lines 16 & 17).
Sandra, while before Judge Garff, was not told
that she had a right to be confronted by witnesses
and the right to have them cross examined or the right
to counsel for herself and a right to notice of the hear-
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ings, that she could keep silent if she wished, or what
she might state to any officer taking her into custody,
coud be used against her at the hearing. See Tr. 10.
The following was asked Sandra Cloud:
"The court: Did anybody explain Sandra's rights
at that hearing?
Mr. 1\!Iarsden: They tell me no. Is that correct,
Sandra?
Sandra Cloud: Yes." (Lines 18, 20 and 21, Tr. 10).
These questions refer to the hearing before Judge Garff
after Sandra was brought from the hospital at Provo
to the Juvenile Detention Home in Salt Lake County,
Tr. 14 and 15).
Sandra Cloud relies on the case of: In The
Matter of Gault, 18 L. Ed. 2nd 527 (1967), for discharging her from the State Industrial School and
her baby from the custody of the Children's Aid Society. In the case at bar, Sandra Claud was committed to said school at the age of 16. The procedure
used in Juvenile Courts had never been examined
under the United States Constitution. The Gault decision had a revolutionary effect on the law applicable to
delinquent children by determining that in all "fact
finding" hearings (hearings in whcih it is determined
what the child has done and in which determination of
delinquency is made which may result in a commitment
of the child to an institution) the child must be given
all the essentials of due process and fair treatment.
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The facts of the Gault case are fairly simple: 111
June, 1964, fifteen-year-old Gerald Francis Gault
allegedly telephoned .Mrs. Cook, a neighbor of the
Gault family in Gila County, Arizona, and made lewd
or indecent remarks to her. He was adjudicated a delin·
quent in Juvenile court and ordered committed to the
State Industrial School for boys "For the period of his
minority" (until age 21) "unless sooner discharged by
due process of law". The factual issue before the Arizona Court was whether Gerald Gault in company of
another teenager made obscene remarks by phone to
Mrs. Cook. The case was resolved by the Arizona court
without furnishing in writing the charges against Gerald
to him or his parents, without determining if Gerald
wanted counsel, without bringing the accusing witnesses into the hearing, without advising the juvenile
of his right to remain silent, without a transcript, and
without a right to appeal. The Arizona Supreme Court
found that petitioners were not denied due process of
law. The Supreme Court of the United States reversed
that decision.
The Gault case is somewhat more spectacular as
an example of abuse of the right of a juvenile offender
than the case at bar. The following factors are com·
parable between the cases.
In the Gault case the erring juvenile was fifteen
years of age when the offense was committed. In the
case at bar the juvenile offender was sixteen years of
age.
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2. In both cases the child was adjudicated without

determining if he wanted counsel, without bringing the
accusing witness or witnesses into the hearings, without
advising the juvenile of his right to remain silent, without submitting evidence swearing any witnesses and
without counsel specifically as her counsel.
RIGHT TO COUNSEL

Case Law on Right to Courusel:
The standard as established in the Gault case with
regard to the right of a juvenile and his parents to be
represented by Counsel is that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause * * *
" . . . requires that in respect of proceedings to
determine delinquency which may result in commitment
to an institution in which the juvenile's freedom is curtailed, the child and his parents must be notified of the
child's rights to be represented by counsel retained by
them, or if they are unable to afford counsel, that counsel will be appointed to represent the child." (Emphasis
added.) 18 L.Ed. 2nd at 554.
The clear holding of the court is that not only must
the child and his parents be notified of the child's right
to be represented by counsel of their choosing, but if
they are unable to afford counsel the court must inform
them of their right to have appointed counsel. It is
important to note that the court has an affirmative duty
to inform the juvenile and his parents of their right to
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counsel. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 ( 1962).
Therefore, the court fails to so advise both the child
and parents, and proceeds with the hearing, the adjudication of delinquency and the order of commitment in
the absenceof counsel for the child and his parents or
an express waiver of the right by both parties to the
constitutional rights of the child under the due process
clause will have been violated and the court proceedings
fatally defective.
The court in the Gault case made it clear that
neither the judge nor the probation officer is in a posi·
tion to act as counsel for the child. The court stated
that "there is no material difference in this respect
between adult and juvenile proceedings, this contention
has been foreclosed by decisoins of this court.

Powell v. Alaba?na, 287 U.S. 45, 61, 77 L.Ed. 158,
166, 53 S. Ct. 55, 84; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799, 83 S. Ct. 792; 18 L.Ed 2d at 551.
The court further stated at page 551:
"A proceeding where the issue is whether the
child will be found to be delinquent and subject
to the loss of his liberty for years is comparable
in seriousness to a felony prosecution. The juvenile needs the assistance of counsel to cope with
problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the
facts, to insist upon regularity of the proceedings, and to ascertain whether he has a def e.nse
and to prepare and submit it. The child reqwres
the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the
prceedings."
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The court also stated at page 551:
" ... we hold that it (the assistance of counsel)
is . . . essential for the determination of delinquency, carrying with it the awesome prospects
of incarceration in a state institution until the
juvenile reaches the age of 21."
In conclusion,t he court observes at page 554:
"We conclude that the due process clause of
the 14th Amendment requires that in respect of
proceedings to determine delinquency which may
result in the commitment to an institution in
which the juvenile's freedom is curtailed, the
child and his parents must be notified of the
child's rights to be represented by counsel retained by them or if they are unable to afford
counsel, that counsel will be appointed to represent the child."

Utah Statutory Law on Right to Council.
The holding of the Supreme Court in the Gault
case with regard to counsel could not have come as too
great a shock to the Juvenile Court System of Utah.
Section 55-10-96 of the Utah Juvenile Court Act pro~
vides:
"Parents, guardian, the child's custodians, and
the child, if old enough, shall be informed that
they have the right to be represented by counsel
at every stage of the proceedings. They have the
right to employ counsel of their own choosin&";
and if any of them request an attorney and is
found by the court to be without sufficient financial me~ns to employ an attorney, counsel shall
be appointed by the court."
11

The Utah statute limits the duty of a court to inform
the child of his right to be represented by counsel to
those children only who are "old enough." Gault place~
no such limitation on such a fundamental right as this.
Both child and parents, according to Gault, have the
absolute right to be informed of their rights in this
regard.
Likewise, the Supreme Court in Gault puts an
absolute duty upon the court to inform the juvenile
and his parent, if they are indigent, of their right to
have the court appoint an attorney to represent them
free of charge. Contrary to the Utah statute, the right
of the child and his parents in this regard is in full effect
whether they request an attorney or not.
POINT II
THE JUVENILE COURT OF THE FIRST
DISTRICT IN OGDEN WAS WITHOUT
AUTHORITY TO PLACE BABY BOY CLOUD
OUT FOR ADOPTION.
How can Sandra Cloud be charged with delin·
quency or neglect of her child when she has never had
its custody from the date of its birth on June 21, 1967
at the Dee Hospital, but only saw the baby for 5 or
10 minutes after its birth? (Tr. 18). Sandra Cloud
has never had an opportunity to demonstrate her capa·
bilities in caring for her child, since she was an inmate
of the Industrial School. "\Vhether the baby is a dependent child cannot be determined until she has been
12

granted the care, charge and custody of the baby. We
think, therefore, that the Juvenile Court at Ogden had
no power or authority to place the baby out for adoption
in custody of the Children's Aid Society of Utah. See
decree on Form 13B of the Juvenile Court filed December 13, 1967.
The Juvenile Courts of Utah have exclusive
original jurisdiction over persons under 18 years of
age who are either delinquent, dependent or neglected,
except in felony cases. Baby Boy Cloud falls in none
of these categories until his mother has been given his
custody and demonstrates that the baby has become
dependent or neglected by her lack of proper maternal
care. Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 55-10-5.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the order of the
District Court for Weber County, Utah, should be rerersed denying the plaintiffs the right of habeas corpus
in this matter and discharge Sandra Cloud from the
State Industrial School and her baby from the custody
of the Children's Aid Society of Utah and that the
Decree of the First Juvenile District Court of Utah,
placing the baby in the custody of the Children's Aid
Society for adoption be declared null and void and
that the baby be given to his mother or in the alternative
to his grandparents.
Respectfully submitted,
A. M. MARSDEN
Attorney for Appellants
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